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Abstract Between members of a network, interorgani-
zational resilience is favored by effective collaboration and
coordination during a crisis. The quality of that col-
laboration depends on various iterative factors present be-
tween these organizations before the occurrence of a crisis.
We find that these factors are iterative since collaboration
factors follow a mutually reinforcing cycle: collaboration
within a crisis management network is conditioned by a
general agreement, which is in turn conditioned by the
extent to which the institutions coordinate themselves prior
to crisis. We evaluated the factors that promote col-
laboration between public and private organizations that
manage the Greater Montre´al transportation infrastructure.
These factors are based on adaptive management processes
such as mutual agreements, common organizational cul-
ture, knowledge and financial resources, levers of power,
regulations, and pressure. Crisis management coordination
represents the ability to build and assess the effectiveness
of common response plans to risks to which they are ex-
posed. We show how these processes vary depending on
the links between private and public organizations.
Keywords Adaptive management  Collaborative
management  Interorganizational
resilience  Montre´al  Transportation infrastructure
1 Introduction
To respond to complex events involving more than one
organization, and to mitigate deficiencies in collective
management that arose during previous crises, Wise (2006)
advocates ‘‘adaptive management.’’ This management
model improves the resilience of a network by facilitating
coordination between different entities operating in the
same particular context, although pursuing objectives that
are both common and independent. Adaptive management
is underpinned by the need to bring together the actors
concerned with a problem to ensure collaboration in action.
This collaboration is sustained by the systematic sharing of
information possessed by each stakeholder, and by the
pooling of their objectives. It is only through collective
analysis of information that joint decisions can be made to
reduce efficiently the consequences of a situation. Fol-
lowing this sharing, the actors can implement concerted
action plans. Direct and indirect impacts from this decision
making can then be analyzed in real time with a scientific
approach. The decision-makers can consequently adapt
their decisions to the changing environment. Adaptive
management promotes organizational learning, while it
puts the scientific data gathered to optimal use. It also
grants the flexibility that managers require to adapt their
actions as new information becomes available. Decisions
are thus seen as learning opportunities because they are
based on incomplete information that should be constantly
enriched. Adaptive management is thus an active, con-
tinuous process.
Adaptive management begins by bringing together the
interested parties to discuss the problem and exchange the
available data. The decision-makers can then develop
models or action plans to solve the problem (Johnson
1999). Therefore the first objective of coordination
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between organizations that want to respond to a common
problem or crisis consists of identifying the members of the
network affected by the event and jointly defining the
scope of the problem. During a crisis, the need for coor-
dination between the parties concerned increases, but the
need to coordinate is not uniquely related to solving a
common problem (Gray 1985). Coordination must origi-
nate from a common approach upstream of a particular
situation and is rooted in a collaboration process.
The quality of this collaboration is notably conditioned
by factors that encourage this relation (Alexander 1993).
Collaboration between organizations will attain specific
objectives only if the various stakeholders involved agree
on the nature of this relation, and on the roles and re-
sponsibilities of each actor. The legitimacy of all the par-
ticipants in a common process also strongly influences the
quality of the relation among the organizations (Gray 1985;
Klijn 2008). Before coordinating to solve a problem, the
actors concerned must consider that the collaboration will
have beneficial effects on their organization such that the
relation generates the anticipated results (Schermerhorn
1975).
Moreover, number of participants, mixed motives, free-
riding, and other contextual and institutional pressures
among other factors tamper the willingness and ability for
adaptive efficiency in an open collaboration context (Lotia
and Hardy 2008). Particularly in the context of crisis, there
is ground for opportunistic behavior (Gilbert 2003). In
Benson’s (1975) theory of interorganizational networks,
organizations’ powers vary according to internal network
structure and external ties, that is, external social linkages
embedded in larger ‘‘societal dominance’’ patterns. Inter-
action, according to Benson, is therefore always oriented
towards ‘‘the fulfillment of program requirements […] the
maintenance of a clear domain of high social importance
[…] the maintenance of orderly, reliable pattern of re-
source flow […or] the extended application and defense of
the agency’s paradigm’’ (Benson 1975, pp. 232–233).
These empirically-grounded insights prove that in
analyzing complex systems, whose boundaries are blurred
by the complexity of the issues requiring collaborative
management, it cannot be presumed that linkages in net-
works are exempt from power bargains and other
mechanisms of self-defence and self-promotion. Therefore,
coordination between organizations is enabled by various
incentive or coercive factors, internal or contextual to the
communication, decisional process (Alexander 1993; De
Bruijne et al. 2010). We begin by presenting our findings
on the main incentives that favor coordination between the
members of the network of managers of transport critical
infrastructures of Greater Montre´al, and identify the key
differences between public and private organizations of the
same network. Next we explain the empirical background
of this case study. Then we introduce the methodology
used to evaluate organizational models and explore the
iterative factors that promote collaboration in an emer-
gency situation. We then present our findings and show
how mutual agreement on the objectives of the relation, a
common culture, access to physical, human and informa-
tion resources, levers of power and regulations, and various
pressures and sanctions can positively or negatively influ-
ence collaboration between organizations. The article
concludes by proposing avenues that emerge from the re-
sults obtained.
2 Research Empirical Background
The critical infrastructure (CI) systems of Que´bec have
been scarcely studied in the past twenty years (Que´bec
1994, 1999; Therrien 2010; Tremblay 2010). After the ice
storm crisis of 1998, the meteorological services were
added to Canada’s classification of CI. The domino effect
that resulted from the storm—power outages disrupt the
banking system and threaten water safety, health facilities,
and other essential supplies—made it clear that essential
infrastructures where at risk. More than one in three
households was without power or heat during prolonged
periods in the cold of Que´bec’s winter. All critical infras-
tructure network members were mobilized and made aware
of their common vulnerability to such wide-ranging dis-
ruptions, tight coupling, and mutual interdependency. In
Que´bec following an analysis of this 1998 event, 12 re-
silience sectors were created by the government to over-
view risks and conduct crisis coordination planning efforts
(Que´bec 2009).
As noted by Lindsay (2014), legislation declaring a state
of emergency granted the federal authority varying ex-
traordinary powers for emergency response purposes, but
the legislative acts grant few powers over or responsibility
for the reduction of risks. The governments of Que´bec and
Canada, as well as the municipal authorities, share juris-
diction over the threats that could affect one or several of
the critical infrastructures. Moreover, the public and pri-
vate sectors are conjointly responsible to maintain CI in-
tegrity or reinstall CI capacity after times of failure
(Tremblay 2010). Since the September 11 attacks in the
United States, national security policies have targeted five
strategic intervention sectors with respect to potential
threats of disruption within Canada: transport, health
emergencies, border security, international security, and
emergency operation and planning as well as intelligence
(Godbout 2008).
Past research findings have described some of the fea-
tures of the transportation network as critical infrastructure
in Que´bec, more precisely, the Greater Montre´al
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metropolitan region. Based on a 209 respondents survey,
we determined that the transport network was viewed
positively by respondents despite having a reputation for
being riven by power struggles between system compo-
nents. This positive image derived from the ability of the
Greater Montre´al Transportation system to gather and
communicate information about the infrastructure’s state
through media channels. The transportation community
was viewed by respondents as a more effective and open
communicator than, for instance, the energy and telecom-
munication networks. Internal information dissemination
within the transportation sector was also more statistically
significant in our analysis and more successful (Valiquette-
L’Heureux and Therrien 2013).
3 Methodology
Our evaluation is based on a qualitative method that allows
us to analyze the organizational practices that favor in-
terorganizational resilience, adopted by the members of the
network studied. Our main concern was to avoid separating
the phenomenon studied from its context. Accordingly, we
decided to adopt a semi structured interview technique
(Patton 2002). Using this approach, one can discover new
perspectives to better understand the phenomenon studied,
which may not have been considered during the formula-
tion of the theoretical framework. This methodology thus
provides insight into coordination between organizations of
the critical infrastructures network by a ‘‘sweeping
in’’ process (Dewey 1938). The purpose of this approach
resides in its flexibility, because the understanding is
gradually consolidated according to the conversations and
by addition of points of view on the same phenomenon.
We then identified the organizations in our network that
appeared to be most representative of the network studied.
The sample comprises 16 organizations in the Greater
Montre´al transportation network that work in maritime, air,
railway, and highway transportation. These organizations
represent both the public and private sectors.
The transportation sector is vital maintenance of the
quality of life in urban areas. By defining the transportation
network of greater Montre´al as a sociotechnical system,
that is a system composed of interrelated technical and
social elements, we can readily consider the members of
this infrastructure and its immediate network. The imme-
diate network of our selected organizations is comprised in
our analysis. Respondents were asked to define and assess
their relationship with the organizations upon which they
are directly dependant.
The transportation sector is important because the major
players therein are diverse and represent important organi-
zations in the Montre´al environment. The Greater Montre´al
context is distinctive because for most transportation orga-
nizations, the managers of the physical infrastructures in the
network are public organizations, but the organizations that
use these physical infrastructures to carry out their op-
erations are mostly private. In addition, the majority of the
entities that secure the network are also public. Organiza-
tions targeted by this research are therefore private, public,
and parapublic and are involved in the management of the
Greater Montre´al region transportation network. We define
this network of organization as the Greater Montre´al trans-
portation system, which represents the main unit of our
analysis. We therefore examine the structural strategies of
different organizations using system analysis. Within the 16
organizations on which the study focused, we conducted
individual interviews with 23 stakeholders. The managers
interviewed were not identified to preserve their identity as
well as the confidentiality of the information they shared.
This methodology allowed us to create pragmatic theoretical
concepts, known as grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss
1967). Grounded theory is defined as a theory that ‘‘is dis-
covered, developed and provisionally verified through sys-
tematic data collection and analysis of data pertaining to that
phenomenon. Therefore, data collection, analysis and theory
stand in reciprocal relationship with each other’’ (Strauss
and Corbin 1990, p. 23).
Our approach began with open coding of the available
data. Specifically, we identified and categorized different
variables of the phenomenon studied by examining the data.
We thus noted a series of recurrent themes raised during
individual interviews, related to the initial hypotheses. We
then performed selective analysis of the data. To do so, we
identified the constants within each initial category to de-
termine the emerging theory (Gray 2004). We analyzed the
relations between the emerging theories and the data
available to validate the emerging theories, and identified
differences in viewpoints by situating them in their context
to define whether these divergences represented marginal
exceptions or new emerging theories. After having estab-
lished the emerging theories and created relations among
them, we reached the findings presented in this article.
An approach based on individual interviews yielded a
specific vision of the situation. The data obtained appeared
rich in examples, but it lacked precision. Although the
research was primarily qualitative, we decided to gather
some quantitative data to validate certain observations and
paint a broader picture of the network examined. We
therefore developed a questionnaire to submit to a larger
sample of respondents than the number we could interview
individually within a reasonable time frame.
To build this questionnaire, we cross tabulated the data
obtained during individual interviews with the theoretical
bases from the literature. The questions let us validate in-
formation obtained during individual interviews and
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permitted us to compare some theories that could not be
observed during the interviews. The responses obtained
were then weighted by organization. All responding orga-
nizations were given equal weight.
We contacted public organizations at the federal,
provincial and municipal levels. Given the delicate nature
of the subject of interest, the busyness of the vast majority
the people we selected, and our several attempts to reach
them, either by email or phone, the final response rate of
18.4 % was poor but not unexpected. We obtained results
from 36 organizations represented by 86 managers from
different departments or divisions who answered to our
secure online survey in 2010—our grounded case study is a
part of a wider study designed to compare three types of
Greater Montreal’s critical infrastructure; only the re-
sponses from 16 transportation and civil safety partner
organizations were kept for this analysis. We believe we
met with a sufficient number of actors and compiled re-
sponses from enough organizations and their employees to
obtain data saturation for the network studied through a
replication logic. Accordingly, when the results obtained
during the analysis do not allow one to obtain further
common threads or to observe marked differences between
the subjects, replication has been achieved, and the re-
search hypotheses can be validated (Hlady Rispal 2002).
Our first hypothesis was that although proactive re-
silience represents a more effective strategy to insure the
long-term resilience of a system, few organizations adopt a
similar approach. Therefore, the first preoccupation of or-
ganizations following crisis would be to restore all ac-
tivities to their status prior to the event as quickly as
possible rather than to maintain a minimum level of service
while the organization adapts the structures and models to
the event. Our second hypothesis was that some organi-
zations were sharing the management of common prob-
lems. We also expected that such collaboration was favored
by the collective comprehension that systematic informa-
tion gathering and sharing made possible. We expected
some common action plans resulting from this proactive
approach, but we doubted that the majority of such plans
would be accompanied by quality measurement indicators.
Lastly, we expected that only rarely would organizations
enjoy the scientific validation of their common initiatives.
We compiled the responses obtained and analyzed them
using the statistical data analysis software SPSS to obtain a
more accurate picture of the situation. Cross tabulating
these data yielded the findings discussed in this article.
4 Results
In this section, the results from our data analysis are pre-
sented with reference to the empirical and theoretical
background on which our four hypotheses are based. We
address first the general agreement antecedents, which refer
to cultural and relational ‘‘common grounds’’ that are
identified in the literature as favoring coordination. Second,
our results regarding the effect of regulations, pressures,
and sanctions are put forward. We then move to what our
case study enlightens in consideration with the relationship
between collaboration and access to resources and finally,
power and leadership issues that our survey data explored
are presented and discussed.
4.1 General Agreement: Relational ‘‘Common
Grounds’’
The relations between members of a same network should
be characterized by a common culture, based on the pre-
mise that organizations in the same network should share
similar values, language, and approach. Relations that rest
on mutual agreement about objectives and the roles and
responsibilities of each party in the relationship will be
more effective. When managing a crisis, those character-
istics should improve the effectiveness of concerted
actions.
We have evaluated whether overall, the organizations
questioned feel that they mutually agree on the objectives
of these relations and on the importance of maintaining
them. A majority of the respondents agreed with this
statement. Among both private (88 %) and public (77 %)
organizations, respondents agree that relations with close
members of their network are based on a common view of
the objectives of the relationship. The level of proximity of
the various organizations does not seem to have a positive
or negative effect on the quality of this relationship. With a
few exceptions, the organizations seem to agree on the
objectives of their relations regardless of the degree of
proximity with other organizations. The mutual agreements
that govern relations between organizations in the same
network may be formal or informal. Not all organizations
conclude explicit agreements to determine the objectives of
this relationship or to establish the role and responsibilities
of each party. But several stakeholders interviewed think
that the formalization of these agreements reduces misun-
derstandings among the parties concerned. The organiza-
tions interviewed whose primary mission is interventionist
are more likely to develop formal agreements to regulate
responses at a disaster site. Organizations that largely re-
spond to crises often share action frameworks and mutual
plans that define the basic roles and responsibilities of the
main stakeholders. For example, the Que´bec provincial
government adopted, in cooperation with the main mu-
nicipalities in the province and the professional asso-
ciations concerned, a framework for coordination at
disaster sites. This cooperative framework was intended to
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guide municipalities and organizations to put in place a
system that allowed coordination of responses at disaster
sites to ensure an optimal, concerted, and effective re-
sponse (Que´bec 2008). This framework has been updated
recently, when a new civil safety policy was adopted with
the objective of enhancing communities’ resilience through
better territorial planning, risks communication and
mitigation, and coordination and management of disasters
(Que´bec 2014). All organizations that act at disaster sites in
Que´bec must follow the guidelines of this framework.
Many respondents also referred to joint response plans that
allow organizations to define the role and responsibilities
of each actor. These plans set out communication methods
between the hierarchical levels of the participating
organizations.
Respondents who had a predominantly operational
mission had entered into formal agreements mainly with
the organizations within its immediate network. Respon-
dents saw some advantages in this relationship concerning
the quality of the potential response. Their main priority
was to rapidly resume their regular operations following a
disaster. The agility and resilience required by crisis
situations are fostered by specific elements that reside
within the framework of collaboration networks (Camar-
inha-Matos 2014). Mutual agreement is essential for al-
lowing partner organizations to trust their immediate
threat-response network. Resilience can therefore be con-
sidered network-wide skill that requires for each network
partner to invests its trust.
To reach a mutual agreement on the objectives of the
relationship, it is desirable for the stakeholders to have a
prior history of good relations. These relations may be
imposed by dependence required for the effectiveness of
one of the organizations, or by regulation making this re-
lation mandatory. Otherwise, relations can be built on
common objectives only if efforts are made to improve the
trust among the actors concerned (Ansell and Gash 2008).
When no history of sharing exists between the participants
in a given network, relations will still be marked by the
participants’ subjective evaluation, which would probably
be characterized more by stereotypes of all kinds (Mandell
and Steelman 2003).
The questionnaire therefore asked whether the rela-
tionship between organizations and other members of the
network rests on a history of good relations. Near 65 % of
the respondents agree or agree completely with the state-
ments. Very few respondents (10 %), the majority of them
work at private organizations, think that this relationship is
not built on a harmonious history. Respondents from the
private sector (19 %) claim that relations with organiza-
tions in their network do not rest on good relations. But
there might be a link between the cases where this rela-
tionship is not based on a history of good relations and the
level of proximity between organizations. The World
Economic Forum (2013, p. 20) has pointed out that public
sectors in North America and Europe were striving for
preferential treatment during crisis and placed priorities on
retaining partnerships, whereas within private sectors
worldwide prevention of loss of market share and com-
petitiveness draw organizations to search for diversity of
supply chains and distrust in governmental actions because
of potential negative side effects of government regulation
on market profitability.
The quality of the relationship between organizations
may rest on shared values, languages, and methods. Gray
(1985) says that establishing a common objective during
problem solving is greatly facilitated by the sharing of
common values between the organizations involved. In-
versely, when there is a gap between the values of the
various parties, coordinated action may not be smooth.
‘‘When stakeholders hold conflicting values and widely
differing perspectives on the problem, initial interactions
must be designed to promote valid exchange of information
and to search common ways to framing the problem’’
(Gray 1985, p. 925). Most of the respondents (74 %) who
completed the questionnaire think that the existence of a
shared language facilitates communication between two
organizations in the same network. No respondents from
the private sector think that relations with different orga-
nizations are not facilitated by a shared language. In the
public sector, a modest 8 % of respondents think that their
relation with other organizations does not rest on a shared
vocabulary (Fig. 1). Even if organizations in the same
network share a common language, the same is not nec-
essarily true of their methods. Respondents’ propensity to
agree with the following statement: ‘‘Overall, we have
approaches and methods in common with the organizations
in my network’’ was much lower than for the shared lan-
guage statement. Only 9.4 % of respondents agree com-
pletely with this assertion. Of those who completed the
questionnaire, 19 % claim that they do not have approaches
and methods in common with the other organizations in
their network (Fig. 1). Organizations in the same network
may have a common vocabulary but not necessarily com-
mon methods and approaches. Some thus use a common
language despite having dissimilar practices.
It is interesting to examine the main incentives that
encourage the development of a shared language and pro-
cedures. After analyzing the interviews with various
stakeholders, we determined that the acquisition of a
common language and methods rests on three main pillars.
First, the creation of institutional tools of various types
allows parties to propose a vocabulary and processes that
can be shared with organizations in their network. For
example, some organizations developed a video explaining
their particular response methods to inform other members
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of their network. Some government organizations also fa-
vor the production and publication of explanatory docu-
ments on good practices in their area of activity and on the
related regulations. This approach contributes to the pro-
posal and diffusion of a particular language that organi-
zations want to share.
Second, the creation of formal committees between or-
ganizations in the same network, or between representa-
tives of similar departments at different organizations, also
favors the acquisition of a shared language and methods.
These committees may be strategic or operational. It is
possible for organizations to share their particular concerns
and propose methods that correspond both to their own
objectives and to the needs of other organizations in their
network. Such committees would allow organizations to be
in contact with particular industries with which they are
linked only for specific actions. These working groups al-
low the parties to exchange necessary information.
So we don’t necessarily know the industries in depth,
but by being on these platforms, we have a shared
language, we listen to their concerns and we can
mutually improve our methods to prevent and prepare
depending on the risks, etc. (Interview W)
Lastly, organizations that develop and offer training can
take pride not only in publicizing the procedures and
mechanisms of their operations to participating organiza-
tions, but can also develop a precise vocabulary that will be
shared by other members of the same network. The re-
spondents supporting this approach think that it will allow
them to improve their response and let the organization
attenuate the risks to its system arising from interaction
involving stakeholders from various spheres. Training is
often developed by an organization that hopes that one of
the entities of the same network can understand all the
facets of a given action. The training proposed by a leader
also brings together organizations from the same sector
around a particular problem.
Recent literature on extended enterprise systems found
that common objectives are achieved in a more efficient
fashion when interoperability is present (Mansouri et al.
2011). Such a capacity is closely linked to the extent that
each infrastructure constituent effectively works towards
that common objective. This shared goal builds network
responsiveness, which allows systems, such as transporta-
tion systems, to sustain themselves in their ever evolving
environments (Mansouri et al. 2011).
4.2 Regulations, Pressures and Sanctions
Some relations between members of the same network are
governed by legislation or formal rules that make them
Fig. 1 Use of shared language,
approaches, and methods in
public (a) and private
(b) organizations
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necessary or desirable. Relations between members of the
Greater Montre´al transportation network are strongly en-
couraged by the presence of laws and rules. Over 74 % of
respondents claim that the effect of the presence of laws or
formal rules makes relations necessary or desirable. A total
of 75 % of respondents at private organizations agree with
this statement, compared with 74 % of respondents in the
public sector (Fig. 2). Joint operations between private and
public organizations often seem to be structured by leg-
islative and regulatory frameworks.
If the presence of laws and rules dictate a form of col-
laboration, these relations are not made desirable by the
fear of sanctions, be they legal or economic. Barely 26 %
of respondents feel that the fear of sanctions supports re-
lations with other members of the network. These fears are
more present in the private sector, where 31 % of respon-
dents say they maintain some relations out of fear of
sanctions, whereas only 24 % of public organizations do
not fear pressures from different sources (Fig. 2). We can
therefore posit that laws or rules that govern relations be-
tween members of the network are only slightly coercive or
not at all, because sanctions have little effect on relations.
Further, respondents mentioned potential sanctions for
noncompliance with contractual agreements governing
their relations more than sanctions stipulated in state laws
or regulations.
We also sought to determine whether informal forms of
pressure favored relations between stakeholders. Clearly
such pressures were present, since 63 % of respondents in
the private sector and 61 % of respondents working in
public organizations recognize the existence of some form
of pressure. This pressure, which may be felt through in-
dustry culture, public pressure, or exemplary practices, is
experienced equally by private and public organizations.
Due to the complex nature of policy objective, and to the
growing tendency for public services to be ensured indi-
rectly and by several institutional stakeholders intercon-
nected in multiorganizational networks, one would expect
that public organizations would be more subject to
collaboration pressure. Interestingly, 8 % of respondents in
the public sector disagree completely with this statement,
compared with no respondents from private organizations.
4.3 Access to Resources
Organizations must consider sharing with other members
of a coordinated network worthwhile, because doing so
demands time and energy. The stakeholders’ participation
thus partly depends on their expectations that this col-
laboration will produce significant results (Ansell and Gash
2008). Incentives to participate are weak when the inter-
ested parties can attain their objectives unilaterally or
through alternative means. Organizations thus seek rela-
tions with other organizations in their network to fill var-
ious needs.
Collaboration between organizations can be encouraged
by the advantages of this relationship. Access to various
resources, be they human, information, or physical, is a
considerable incentive for maintaining collaborative rela-
tions with other organizations. An organization may re-
quire these resources to fulfil its mission. When the
resources are essential, the relationship of dependence is
critical for the organization.
Four elements in the questionnaire allowed us to paint a
general portrait of the effects of access to various resources
that favor collaboration between organizations. First, 40 %
of respondents think that one of the effects of this rela-
tionship is that it allows the organization to access physical
resources. The majority of these respondents are in the
private sector. Three quarters of the respondents in the pri-
vate sector report that their relations with different organi-
zations in the network give them access to various physical
resources (Fig. 3). Inversely, public organizations seem to
be less inclined to seek access to physical resources through
their relations with other members of the network: 47 % of
public sector respondents disagree with that statement.
Public organizations are not necessarily seeking to in-
crease their organization’s financial resources through
Fig. 2 Role of regulations in
promoting interorganizational
cooperation
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relations with other entities. Slightly more than half of
these respondents (52 %) do not think that one of the ef-
fects of their relations is to give them access to different
sources of income. In contrast, 69 % of private organiza-
tions see a financial advantage in their relations. Overall,
36 % of respondents from all sectors combined think that
their organization’s relations let them increase their fi-
nancial resources, whereas 49 % of respondents disagree.
We also sought to determine whether the presence of
economic advantages such as economies of scale would
make relations with other organizations in the network
desirable. Once again, this factor encourages more private
than public organizations to maintain such relations. Re-
spondents from the private sector (78 %) note such ad-
vantages, whereas less than half (48 %) of respondents in
the public sector share that view (Fig. 3).
Dynamism of organizations is closely related to the
extent to which their information-processing abilities are
effective in triggering both swift and smooth ‘‘reorienta-
tion.’’ Such organizational dynamism transforms insights
regarding volatility—whether this knowledge is economic
and related to demand or to the supply chain—into dy-
namic restructuring operations that allow institutions to
adapt and execute cleverly (Accenture 2012). Since the
organizational goals of private organization are dissimilar
in many aspects, we anticipated that the efforts in infor-
mation integration also would differ. Nonetheless, public
and private organizations tend to exhibit similar views
when it comes to the quest for information resources
(Fig. 3). A majority (56 %) of respondents in the public
sector agree or agree completely with the following state-
ment: ‘‘One of the advantages of this relation is that it
increases my organization’s information resources (for
example, data, statistics).’’ In the private sector, percent-
ages are slightly higher, but fairly similar, in that 63 % of
the respondents also think that one of the effects of their
relations is to gain access to different sources of informa-
tion (Fig. 3).
Lastly, we have examined whether relations between
organizations can be encouraged by the search for expertise
beyond the organization. Just over half (51 %) of respon-
dents claim that collaboration can let them acquire sup-
plementary expertise, which comes from their
collaborators’ know-how and practices they have devel-
oped or experience they could contribute. It seems that this
quest for expertise may be slightly more prevalent among
public entities than private organizations. Even if the per-
centage of respondents that agree with the statement is
similar (50 % in the public sector versus 44 % in the pri-
vate sector), a larger proportion of respondents in the pri-
vate sector disagree (38 %) with this statement compared
with their counterparts in the public sector (23 %) (Fig. 3).
One can therefore conclude that access to information
resources aside, there is a dichotomy between the advan-
tages sought in relations with public and private sector
organizations. This finding provides important insight into
the reason that organizations forge these relations. Private
and public organizations must coordinate their actions
during an event that affects critical infrastructures, yet each
party is seeking different advantages from these relations.
4.4 Power and Leadership
Although stakeholders’ participation in an information
sharing and coordination process to solve a common
problem is generally voluntary, collaboration between or-
ganizations may also be imposed by legislation, standards,
and formal or informal pressure. Collaboration may also be
associated with the relative power of organizations.
Relations of power between organizations in a network
have a major impact on the quality of coordination and the
involvement of the actors concerned. Imbalances of power
between the stakeholders frequently arise when actors par-
ticipate in a coordinated network. If some stakeholders do
not have the capacity, organization, status, or resources re-
quired to participate on an equal footing with the other
stakeholders, the collaboration process will be subject to
manipulation by the strongest actors (Ansell and Gash 2008).
We therefore sought to determine whether relations
between respondents were characterized by balanced
Fig. 3 Access to physical,
financial, human, and
information resources
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relations of power. We asked respondents whether ‘‘this
relation rests on egalitarian principles (status, levers of
influence, and so on).’’ Slightly fewer than half the re-
spondents (49 %) claim that the relations rest on egalitarian
principles shared by the members. Surprisingly, this per-
ception of equality between the members of the same
network is stronger among private organizations than
public entities. Whereas 47 % of respondents at public
organizations agree with the statement, 66 % of respon-
dents in the private sector believe that their relations with
various organizations are based on egalitarian principles
(Fig. 4).
The relative power of organizations is often attributable
to their skills and responsibilities. The coexistence of public
entities and private organizations within the same network
may not have the same influence on their respective partners
because the actors do not play the same role (Innes and
Booher 1999). Accordingly, respondents perceive executive
organizations in a network differently from other members
of the network. An entity that has the power to affect or-
ganizations in the network will have different power rela-
tions than those that must comply with the demands of
another institution. The respondents nonetheless expressed
the need to reach a consensus during decision making
(Fig. 4), and even during the formulation of regulations.
We have close relations with our partners. I think that
in most cases, we work in concert with them. I would
say there is a mutual influence. For sure, in other
cases if something is decided by decree, not every-
one’s agreement is solicited. In certain cases, it’s
impossible to have the approval of […] especially
when things are coercive […] Often we say we really
understand the bases, the logic, and why we are
obliged to go toward a specific solution. I would say
there is a lot of persuasion or understanding [at]
work. (Interview H)
Power plays are particularly evident when an incident
has an impact on the continuity of an organization’s
operations. For instance, economic imperatives propel the
most powerful organizations to use the relative power they
possess. The respondents feel that the quest for security
takes precedence over formal or informal pressures exerted
by the other actors.
For government entities in particular, the role of each
actor in the network also depends on the territory of the
incident. Federal and provincial organizations have similar
roles to play depending on the jurisdiction of the event site.
For the same event, responsibilities differ if the event oc-
curs on a territory with federal or provincial jurisdiction. A
network may comprise actors that have similar roles and
responsibilities at different times and that must establish
and apply legislation and regulations specifically governing
the territory. In such cases, harmonizing regulations fa-
cilitates understanding by the other organizations in the
network.
The presence of a leader to rally the parties concerned to
collaborate and to solve a common problem is a major
factor affecting the quality of collaboration, and can reduce
the impact of imbalance between the forces at play.
Leadership is often perceived as essential to establish and
maintain clear rules of the game, to build confidence, fa-
cilitate dialogue, and identify the advantages for each of
the participants of collaborating in the process (Ansell and
Gash 2008). The presence of a leader also facilitates the
participation of actors who have relatively lesser weight
within the group. The group leader must strike a balance
among participants and should allow fair and equitable
participation of all concerned.
We determined whether the relations among members of
the network were encouraged or supported by the presence
of a leader or sponsor. A majority of the respondents
(56 %) find that the relation is encouraged by the presence
of a leader, be it an individual or organization. More re-
spondents (56 %) in the public sector agree with the
statement. A larger number of respondents (44 %) in the
private sector tend to disagree with this statement, versus
20 % of respondents in the public sector (Fig. 5).
Fig. 4 Impact of relations of
power between organizations on
collaboration of stakeholders
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The interviews conducted with various stakeholders
from the network studied demonstrated that the presence of
a leader always seems desirable, even if one does not ac-
tually exist. Stakeholders have expectations of a potential
leader: respondents generally consider that this role should
be played by one of the public sector actors in the network.
Nonetheless, public sector organizations do not necessarily
have all the resources required to assume leadership. As
mentioned, these organizations seek expertise from their
relations with other members of the network. Ultimately,
however, they are perceived as the main parties responsible
for leading and coordinating the different entities brought
together to respond to a situation. When these institutions
cannot fully play this role, some of them delegate the re-
sponsibility to more qualified individuals or organizations.
We will try to find someone to carry the ball who is
used to working in this field. What we tell them is,
surround yourself by people. If you have several ac-
tivities, surround yourself by people who are most
skilled to do it because you can’t know all the areas,
but you’re a catalyst. That’s the point of view. When
people understand that they say ‘I don’t have all the
responsibility on my shoulders. I am responsible for
being a catalyst, coordinating, sending and bringing
in.’ Then they understand. For some it’s harder be-
cause they’re only used to their little box, and if it
goes outside the box, it’s harder. (Interview W)
When one of the actors takes the leadership role, a ripple
effect is often observed.
When you talk to people after the crisis, either ev-
eryone took leadership or no one did. When someone
becomes the leader and it went well, everyone says
they were the leader. And it’s true. I think it’s true to
some extent. ‘‘I was the leader until a certain time,
after which someone else was, and after that…’’
(Interview I)
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Even if natural and egalitarian collaboration between dif-
ferent members of the same network may be possible, the
presence of a leader, whether it is an individual or orga-
nization, greatly favors key stakeholders’ participation in
the collective decision-making process. The presence of a
leader confers many advantages such as rebalancing power
among the managers present. In fact, the organizations
contacted have many expectations about the presence and
actions of a leader. This desired leader is often an orga-
nization, typically public, that possesses the expertise and
powers needed to bring the main stakeholders together and
apply measures that favor this collaboration. Such an or-
ganization is called the lead organization. ‘‘This term refers
to the arrangement in which one organization is charged
with, or assumes the responsibility for coordinating the
activities of all the relevant organizations in the interor-
ganizational networks’’ (Alexander 1993, p. 337). This
definition implies that the lead organization assumes the
responsibilities incumbent on all entities that lead a net-
work of organizations. Whereas the lead organization is in
charge of coordinating decisions made by the network
members, the members are responsible for applying the
decisions. This type of structure requires a greater degree
of coordination than the ad hoc structures that can be put in
place. The model of lead organization thus rests mainly on
the structure of the interorganizational system rather than
on the mechanics of concerted decision making. Collective
decision making is marked primarily by its structure, and
therefore by the lead organization. The inability to develop
interorganizational relations outside of the structure (for
example, because of the lead organization’s inability to
meet this need) is a potential problem inherent in this
model.
Other models of interorganizational structure exist and
can be applied to ensure effective collaboration. The sim-
plest structure consists in non administered programs,
Fig. 5 Leaders or sponsors
encourage relations among
members of network
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where members are motivated to unify around the problem
by simple incentives or sanctions. This approach
nonetheless implies that participating organizations must
have the power to put structuring action plans into place.
The leaders of organization networks may also differ from
the lead organization model. For instance, a coordination
unit may be formed. Generally, such a unit is differentiated
by its autonomy, budget, and resources available to carry
out its coordination mission. An individual can also be
designated as coordinator, who will act as a catalytic agent
of the forces present. But the individual and the coordi-
nation unit require autonomy and legitimacy to be able to
fulfill their roles and responsibilities.
Coordination at a disaster site in Que´bec is best fostered
by an approach that rallies the main stakeholders around a
designated coordinator. At the tactical and operational
levels, the main participating organizations must appoint a
representative who will coordinate with representatives of
the other organizations onsite. This unit, commonly called
the on-site emergency operation center, must be coordinated
by the representative of the main organization acting on the
site. This person is called the site coordinator (Que´bec 2008).
Structures that formalize responses at a disaster site may
also apply and be used by organizations seeking to main-
tain their activities through a coordinated network. These
structures formalize coordination between the members,
but can also undermine the flexibility required to ensure a
rapid and coordinated response in an uncertain situation,
where time is perceived as a determining factor of the
quality of the response. Formalization of structures in place
to ensure collaboration is necessary only if the network
members believe that they require interdependence to at-
tain their own objectives (Gray 1985). Decentralization is
important for effective crisis management. The superior
level of hierarchy need to support the lower levels of de-
cisions, rather than to manage them (Comfort, Boin et al.
2010, Comfort, Oh et al.2010). Therefore more informal
structures can also be put in place, and the identification of
a leader can be negotiated by network members. Deference
to expertise, rather than to authority, is crucial in order to
make timely efforts to cope and recover from threats. This
concept can be labelled ‘‘deference downward’’ (Weick
and Sutcliffe 2011, p. 77).
Some factors that can be considered and evaluated in
only particular contexts may hinder collaboration between
various stakeholders in a crisis situation. Actors’ response
time, trust among the stakeholders, and specific interde-
pendence triggered by the crisis are notable examples.
Therefore one cannot determine all the valuables that fa-
cilitate or hinder the pooling of various interests at stake
during a particular emergency situation. However, pre-ex-
isting variables that favor effective collaboration among
the different stakeholders in the network can be evaluated.
Diverse prior conditions may favor collaboration among
different stakeholders or organizations. A relatively equal
balance of power among the different parties, the presence
of incentives to favor the participation of the actors con-
cerned, and a history of good relations among the members
of the network are the main conditions conducive to ef-
fective collaboration (Ansell and Gash 2008; Klijn 2008).
We have found that there is generally a history of good
relations between the members of the network studied. We
also noted that organizations share a common language, but
not necessarily methods. Time and effort required to
identify common objectives will be reduced accordingly
(Gray 1985).
‘‘Collaboration often seemed to depend on achieving a
virtuous cycle between communication, trust, commitment,
understanding, and outcomes’’ (Ansell and Gash 2008,
p. 16). This research enabled us to examine the factors of
trust and understanding. However, as Ansell and Gash em-
phasize, an intrinsic factor to good collaboration is mem-
bers’ commitment to a common cause. Commitment is thus
a highly contextual variable that is influenced by the po-
tential results of the collaboration. We have determined that
public sector actors may gain access to particular expertise
and information from relations to facilitate their everyday
operations. Respondents in the private sector seem to seek
relations that will allow them to increase their financial and
physical resources. These incentives foster collaboration,
but do not guarantee the network members’ commitment to
share their information, and human or physical resources.
These incentives have a greater impact when coordination
allows the stakeholders to achieve concrete results.
Lastly, we have observed that the network is charac-
terized by respect and egalitarian principles among the
members. This respect ensures the legitimacy of all par-
ticipants and facilitates the determination of the roles and
responsibilities of each party when solving a common
problem. ‘‘The appreciation of coincident values and dis-
persion of power among stakeholders enables them to di-
rect their activities toward mutually desirable ends. Once
these conditions have been achieved, visible benefits of
collaboration can begin to accrue’’ (Gray 1985, p. 928).
Although our portrait is limited, we can assume that the
conditions required to ensure collaboration among the
members of the Greater Montre´al transportation infras-
tructure network are present. Pooling the interests of var-
ious individuals, organizations, and organizational systems
appears to be a process that is applied at times, and future
collaboration among members is likely. The various factors
evaluated imply that this collaboration would have fairly
solid foundations. Thus, the factors that facilitate coordi-
nation between members of the same network should be
well known by the leader of this network during a crisis
situation.
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